	
	<span class="Z3988" title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Focoins.info%3Agenerator&amp;rft.title=Les+%C3%A9tats+du+sahel+face+a+l%E2%80%99%C3%A9preuve+de+l%E2%80%99hydre+terroriste+de+2015+%C3%A0+2022&amp;rft.aulast=&amp;rft.aufirst=&amp;rft.subject=RUFSO+Journal+Articles&amp;rft.subject=RUFSO+JSSE+Volume+%3A33&amp;rft.subject=Social+Science+and+Humanities&amp;rft.source=Journal+of+Social+Sciences+and+Engineering&amp;rft.date=2022-07-10&amp;rft.type=blogPost&amp;rft.format=text&amp;rft.identifier=https://rufso.ac.cd/journal/rjsse/2022/07/10/les-etats-du-sahel-face-a-lepreuve-de-lhydre-terroriste-de-2015-a-2022/&amp;rft.language=English"></span>
	
	<span class="Z3988" title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Focoins.info%3Agenerator&amp;rft.title=Les+%C3%A9tats+du+sahel+face+a+l%E2%80%99%C3%A9preuve+de+l%E2%80%99hydre+terroriste+de+2015+%C3%A0+2022&amp;rft.aulast=&amp;rft.aufirst=&amp;rft.subject=RUFSO+Journal+Articles&amp;rft.subject=RUFSO+JSSE+Volume+%3A33&amp;rft.subject=Social+Science+and+Humanities&amp;rft.source=Journal+of+Social+Sciences+and+Engineering&amp;rft.date=2022-07-10&amp;rft.type=blogPost&amp;rft.format=text&amp;rft.identifier=https://rufso.ac.cd/journal/rjsse/2022/07/10/les-etats-du-sahel-face-a-lepreuve-de-lhydre-terroriste-de-2015-a-2022/&amp;rft.language=English"></span>
{"id":2397,"date":"2022-07-10T09:48:54","date_gmt":"2022-07-10T07:48:54","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/rufso.org\/?p=2397"},"modified":"2022-07-10T09:48:54","modified_gmt":"2022-07-10T07:48:54","slug":"les-etats-du-sahel-face-a-lepreuve-de-lhydre-terroriste-de-2015-a-2022","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rufso.ac.cd\/journal\/rjsse\/2022\/07\/10\/les-etats-du-sahel-face-a-lepreuve-de-lhydre-terroriste-de-2015-a-2022\/","title":{"rendered":"Les \u00e9tats du sahel face a l\u2019\u00e9preuve de l\u2019hydre terroriste de 2015 \u00e0 2022"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left\">Le terrorisme est un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne universel, il constitue de ce fait un d\u00e9fi mondial en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral et sah\u00e9lien en particulier.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left\">En effet, profitant de la crise libyenne, les groupes arm\u00e9s compos\u00e9s en partie de Touaregs et arabes de retour au Mali suite \u00e0 la chute du r\u00e9gime Mouammar Kadhafi, d\u00e9clenchent une insurrection arm\u00e9e en janvier 2012 \u00e0 l\u2019issue de laquelle ils parviennent \u00e0 prendre le contr\u00f4le du Nord Mali. Ainsi les villes de Tombouctou, Gao et Kidal tombent sous contr\u00f4le terroriste jusqu\u2019\u00e0 l\u2019intervention fran\u00e7aise appel\u00e9e \u00ab\u00a0op\u00e9ration serval\u00a0\u00bb. Cette intervention a permis de chasser les combattants djihadistes des villes occup\u00e9es. En r\u00e9plique \u00e0 l\u2019intervention fran\u00e7aise en 2013, les groupes terroristes se sont adapt\u00e9s en exploitant les crises et conflits communautaires. Ils se sont non seulement dispers\u00e9s \u00e0 travers l\u2019espace sah\u00e9lo-saharienne mais aussi ont \u00e9galement r\u00e9ussi \u00e0 se fondre dans les populations rurales. Ainsi, ils se sont adapt\u00e9s \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sence militaire accrue et ont d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 des tactiques gu\u00e9rilla comme emploi des engins explosifs improvis\u00e9s (EEI) contre les patrouilles de s\u00e9curit\u00e9. Cet \u00e9tat de fait a rendu la situation s\u00e9curitaire plus que pr\u00e9occupante dans le sahel o\u00f9 la violence est en augmentation. Cette situation d\u00e9gradante a incit\u00e9 les Etats du sahel et leurs partenaires \u00e0 intervenir de mani\u00e8re ad\u00e9quate afin de stabiliser la r\u00e9gion sah\u00e9lienne et de pr\u00e9venir la propagation de l\u2019extr\u00e9misme et la violence contre les civils. A cet effet, les Etats du sahel ont mis en place des m\u00e9canismes de lutte contre le terrorisme dans la zone. Les initiatives des Etats du sahel jouent un r\u00f4le limit\u00e9 parce qu\u2019elles ne sont pas adapt\u00e9es aux r\u00e9alit\u00e9s de ladite zone. Les dirigeants des Etats du sahel doivent inclure le volet diplomatique dans toute son enti\u00e8ret\u00e9 aux diff\u00e9rents m\u00e9canismes existants afin d\u2019obtenir une approche globale de l\u2019hydre terroriste.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left\">L\u2019inclusion de la diplomatie dans toute son enti\u00e8ret\u00e9 dans la lutte contre le terrorisme dans le sahel est plus que n\u00e9cessaire afin de venir \u00e0 bout de ce fl\u00e9au.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Mots cl\u00e9s\u00a0<\/strong>: terrorisme-sahel-diplomatie<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p><strong>Abstract\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Terrorism is a universal phenomenon, and therefore constitutes a global challenge in general and a Sahelian one in particular.<\/p>\n<p>Indeed, taking advantage of the Libyan crisis, armed groups composed in part of Tuaregs and Arabs who returned to Mali following the fall of the Muammar Gaddafi regime, launched an armed insurrection in January 2012, at the end of which they succeeded in taking control of northern Mali. The cities of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal fell under terrorist control until the French intervention called &#8220;Operation Serval&#8221;. This intervention enabled the jihadist fighters to be driven out of the occupied towns. In response to the French intervention in 2013, terrorist groups adapted by exploiting community crises and conflicts. Not only did they disperse across the Sahel-Saharan region, but they also managed to blend in with rural populations. Thus, they have adapted to the increased military presence and developed guerrilla tactics such as the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against security patrols. This has made the security situation in the Sahel more than worrying, with violence on the rise. This deteriorating situation has prompted the Sahelian states and their partners to intervene adequately in order to stabilise the Sahelian region and prevent the spread of extremism and violence against civilians. To this end, the Sahelian states have put in place mechanisms to combat terrorism in the area. The initiatives of the Sahel states play a limited role because they are not adapted to the realities of the Sahel. The leaders of the Sahel states must include the diplomatic component in its entirety in the various existing mechanisms in order to achieve a comprehensive approach to the terrorist hydra.<\/p>\n<p>The inclusion of diplomacy in its entirety in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel is more than necessary to overcome this scourge.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Keywords<\/strong>: terrorism-sahel-diplomacy<\/p>\n<p><strong>Auteurs<\/strong>:\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/rufso.ac.cd\/tag\/sirima-k-maximin\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">SIRIMA K. Maximin<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/rufso.ac.cd\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/07\/RUFSO_vol-33-i2-224d6d503b99208.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">T\u00e9l\u00e9charger l\u2019article<\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u00a9 2022 Le(s) Auteur(s). Publi\u00e9 dans\u00a0<em>\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/rufso.ac.cd\/category\/journal-article\/\">RUFSO Journal Article<\/a>,\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/rufso.ac.cd\/category\/review-university-without-borders-for-the-open-society-rufso-issn-2313-285x-volume-33\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Volume 33<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Abstract Le terrorisme est un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne universel, il constitue de ce fait un d\u00e9fi mondial en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral et sah\u00e9lien en particulier. En effet, profitant de la crise libyenne, les groupes arm\u00e9s compos\u00e9s en partie de Touaregs et arabes de retour au Mali suite \u00e0 la chute du r\u00e9gime Mouammar Kadhafi, d\u00e9clenchent une insurrection arm\u00e9e en&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"_kad_post_transparent":"","_kad_post_title":"","_kad_post_layout":"","_kad_post_sidebar_id":"","_kad_post_content_style":"","_kad_post_vertical_padding":"","_kad_post_feature":"","_kad_post_feature_position":"","_kad_post_header":false,"_kad_post_footer":false,"_kad_post_classname":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[17,135,36],"tags":[136],"class_list":["post-2397","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-journal-article","category-review-university-without-borders-for-the-open-society-rufso-issn-2313-285x-volume-33","category-management-sciences","tag-sirima-k-maximin"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rufso.ac.cd\/journal\/rjsse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2397","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rufso.ac.cd\/journal\/rjsse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rufso.ac.cd\/journal\/rjsse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rufso.ac.cd\/journal\/rjsse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rufso.ac.cd\/journal\/rjsse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2397"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/rufso.ac.cd\/journal\/rjsse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2397\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rufso.ac.cd\/journal\/rjsse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2397"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rufso.ac.cd\/journal\/rjsse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2397"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rufso.ac.cd\/journal\/rjsse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2397"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}